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Abstract— For every contact made on a digital device, a trace is left behind; this means that every digital device contains some form of 
electronic evidence that may be associated to the behaviour of the users in a given environment. This evidence can be used to prove or 
disprove facts if a cyber-incident is detected. However, the world has seen a shift on how devices communicate and connect as a result 
of increased devices and connectivity, which has led to the creation of “smart environments” where the Internet of Things (IoT) plays 
a key role. Still, we can harness this proliferation of digital devices and smart environments to Digital Forensic (DF) technology which 
might help to solve the puzzle of how proactive strategies can help to minimise the time and cost needed to conduct a digital 
investigation. This article introduces the Functional Requirements (FRs) and processes needed when Digital Forensic Readiness 
(DFR) process is employed as a security component in the IoT-based environment. The paper serves as a continuation of the initially 
proposed architecture for adding DFR as a security component to IoT environment. The aspects and claims presented in this paper 
can be used as basic building blocks for implementing DFR technologies that guarantee security in the IoT-based environment. It is 
worth noting again that the processes that have been defined in this paper comply with the ISO/IEC 27043: 2015 International 
Standard.  
 
Keywords— digital forensic readiness; functional requirements; internet of things 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the ever growing trends in technology and 
technological devices in the society today, the world has 
seen a shift in how devices connect and communicate with 
each other. This revolution has, further, led to the creation of 
“smart environments” aided by the Internet of Things (IoT).  
IoT sometimes referred to as the Internet of Objects as 
explained by Triawan et al., [1] describes the connection of 
devices (any devices) which can produce, receive, deliver 
data or information, as well as connect through a wired or 
wireless communication between the same or different 
devices, in order to communicate with each other, without 
any interaction or human interference [2]. 
The IoT revolution has made a huge impact on how 
devices interact with each other as well as with different 
objects. However, this is not necessarily and completely the 
best thing that has ever happened in the world of technology. 
With the growing number of IoT devices in corporate 
networks based on a survey by Tripwire [3], there is a need 
for the industry to address the IoT security basics. From the 
survey, it is evident that less than a third of organisations 
today are prepared for security risks associated with devices 
making up the internet of things (IoT). As a way to limit the 
security risks brought about by IoT devices, it is important 
that such devices be securely configured, patched for 
vulnerabilities as well as monitored consistently. 
However, an alternative approach to addressing IoT 
security within organisations is to embrace Digital Forensic 
Readiness (DFR) as a security component in IoT. For this 
reason, the authors of this paper introduce the Functional 
Requirements (FRs) and processes needed when DFR 
process is employed as a security component in the IoT-
based environment. The aspects and claims presented in this 
paper can be used as basic building blocks for implementing 
DFR technologies that can guarantee security in the IoT-
based environment. 
As for the remainder of this paper, Section II presents 
materials and methods that have been employed in this 
research study, while Section III the results and discussions 
made in this paper. Finally, Section IV presents the 
conclusions made as a result of this study and mentions a 
possible future work. The next section briefs the reader on 
the background. 
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II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
In this section, the authors present the background on the 
Internet of Things (IoT) as well as Digital Forensic 
Readiness (DFR). IoT is discussed to show a new 
technology that is being adopted by a majority of 
organisations to provide interconnectivity of devices, which 
makes it possible to collect, process, and analyse data from 
almost every object. DFR is discussed to show the proactive 
side of Digital Forensics (DF), which can as well be used as 
an information security component in different organisations.  
A. Internet of Things (IoT) 
The world as we know it is a collection of very many 
different things which includes all sorts of physical objects 
and devices. Creating a communication network around 
these physical objects and devices brings about the concept 
of IoT.  
IoT, therefore, is a concept that can simply be described 
as a network of physical objects and devices that contain 
embedded sensors and actuators to help them communicate 
and sense or interact with their internal states or their 
external environment all via the Internet. This also implies 
that, for the objects to communicate they must feature an IP 
address for Internet connectivity. The IP address then 
enables communication between these objects and any other 
Internet-enabled devices and systems. 
However, Barrett [4], describes IoT as a system of 
interrelated computing devices, mechanical and digital 
machines, objects, animals or people that are provided with 
unique identifiers and the ability to transfer data over a 
network without requiring Human-to-Human (H2M) or 
Human-to-Computer interaction (HCI). 
With the wide availability of Broadband Internet, Morgan, 
[5] says that the cost of Internet connections is decreasing by 
the day. Besides, more devices are being created with Wi-Fi 
capabilities and sensors and protocols like ZigBee and IEEE 
802.14.5 built into them to perform real-time monitoring 
[22]. In addition, the technology costs are also going down, 
and smart devices penetration in the society is increasing 
very steeply. These advances in technology thus create a 
perfect environment for IoT to thrive. 
It is for this reason that the authors in this paper, as a way 
to deal with the security risks associated with the IoT-based 
environment, present the Functional Requirements (FR) for 
adding DFR as a security component in IoT Environments. 
This research is motivated by the fact that IoT is a concept 
being adopted by a majority of organisations to provide 
interconnectivity of devices, which makes it possible to 
collect, process, and analyse data from almost every object 
hence the need to deal with security problems. DFR 
concepts are discussed in the next section. 
B. Digital Forensic Readiness 
Today DFR is rapidly becoming an essential component 
of many business organisations. This is backed up by the 
fact that, for every contact made on any digital device used 
within the organisation, a trace is always left. This means 
that every digital device contains some form of electronic 
evidence that may be associated with a particular behaviour 
of the users in a given environment. 
This, therefore, means that a well-coordinated approach to 
DFR process in any organisation will help in maximising the 
potentials use of their electronically stored information as 
well as reduce the cost of conducting digital forensic 
investigations within the organisation [6]. 
However, Cobb [7] states that DFR sounds like a daunting 
challenge to many organisations. As a matter of fact, the 
emergence of the IoT environments has brought about a 
more complex and heterogeneous environment which is 
slowly becoming home to cyber attackers. For this reason, it 
is necessary for organisations to have some form of DFR so 
as to help them in planning and preparing for potential 
cybersecurity incidents. This aspect has motivated this 
research study hence the need to introduce the FRs and 
processes needed when DFR process is employed as a 
security component in the IoT-based environment. The next 
section will briefly highlight the preliminary work that 
supports this study. 
C. Preliminary Work 
As mentioned earlier, the study presented in this paper 
serves as a continuation of an initially proposed architecture 
for adding DFR to IoT environment (DFR-IoT). Besides, the 
aspects and claims presented in this paper act as basic 
building blocks for implementing DFR technologies to help 
in dealing with security in the IoT-based environment. The 
preliminary work, however, only proposed an architecture 
for incorporating DFR to IoT domain for proper planning 
and preparing in the case of security incidents. This is to 
mean that the preliminary work did not specifically address 
the FRs and the processes needed when DFR process is 
employed as a security component in the IoT-based 
environment, which is the focus of the current paper. The 
next section will present related work. 
D. Related Work 
Research in IoT is currently gaining momentum; however, 
studies on the integration of IoT and DFR are still wanting. 
In this section of this paper, therefore, the authors sample 
some of the existing related research work that has helped in 
the development of the FRs and processes needed when 
DFR process is employed as a security component in the 
IoT-based environment. 
To begin with, Van Staden and Venter [8] argue that 
electronic communication is used in our daily lives. 
However, unsolicited electronic communication, also known 
as spam is also on the increase. Tracing the origin of spam 
by using information contained in SMTP headers, for 
example, is not possible because SMTP is a clear text 
protocol and can easily be intercepted and modified. For this 
reason, these authors proposed, adding DFR to electronic 
communication using a security monitoring tool. They also 
add that, during the process of introducing DFR, the amount 
of information that is gathered is inadvertently increased, to 
ensure that the information is valid and usable. However, 
Van Staden and Venter [8], did not address anything close to 
the FRs and processes needed when DFR process is 
employed as a security component in an IoT-based 
environment which is what the current paper focuses on. 
In another presentation, Jason [9] talks about how to 
implement DFR and how to increase operational efficiencies 
343
by implementing a pro-active approach to Digital Forensics 
(DF) throughout an organisation. His work, demonstrates 
how DF aligns strategically with an organisation’s business 
operations and information security’s program. However, 
just like Van Staden and Venter [8], Jason [9] also did not 
specifically address the problem of FRs and processes 
needed when DFR process is employed as a security 
component in the IoT-based environment. Jason [9] 
nonetheless showed in his work how the proper collection, 
preservation, and presentation of digital evidence is essential 
for reducing potential business impact as a result of digital 
crimes, disputes, and incidents. Finally, he concludes by 
illustrating how using a DFR approach and preparedness as a 
business goal can enhance the relevance and credibility of 
digital evidence. 
Another study by Reddy and Venter [10] propose some 
concepts necessary for a Digital Forensic Readiness 
Management System (DFRMS) with the aim to assist large 
organisations in achieving an optimal level of management 
for DFR. The study as well lacked the component that 
addresses the problem of FRs and processes needed when 
DFR process is employed as a security component in IoT-
based environment.  
Although there exist a lot of research and related works 
on DFR, neither those nor the cited references in this paper 
have addressed the problem of FRs and processes needed 
when DFR process is employed as a security component in 
an IoT-based environment in the way that is introduced in 
this paper. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the fact that the 
previous research works have offered useful insights toward 
the development of the functional requirements in this paper. 
In the section that follows the authors briefly explain FRs 
and processes. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The section presents the Functional Requirements (FRs) 
as design parameters that can be used in IoT. The FRs has 
been presented in this research paper in order to bring out 
the essential requirement analysis approaches that can help 
Digital Forensic Readiness (DFR) processes to be 
successfully implemented in an IoT environment. A number 
of distinct processes have been proposed that may help to 
achieve this problem. Firstly, an overview of the initially 
proposed DFR-IoT architecture is shown in Fig. 1, which 
has in turn been used as a basis for generating the FRs. IoT 
design requirements allow the DFR-IoT to be implemented 
at the lowest level possible, which basically means that the 
FR allows the architecture to have a proper proactive process 
that is centered on forensic readiness aspects. For example, 
aspects like the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), 
sensing devices, data transmission modes and the controlling 
units, WANs, LANs, WLANs, Wi-Fi and Ad-hoc networks 
all provide a holistic-cross platform for effective 
communication. 
The DFR-IoT architecture has been presented in the best 
way possible such that it is able to incorporate the proactive 
(DFR) approach, IoT communication mechanism and the 
reactive (Digital Forensic Investigation) process. It is worth 
noting that the requirements that have been presented in this 
research are in line with the DFR processes that have also 
been mentioned in the ISO/IEC 27043: 2015, which is an 
international standard for Information technology - Security 
techniques -Incident investigation principles and processes 
[12]. These processes allow the IoT environment to be 
forensically prepared before potential security events can 
occur thus saving cost and time needed for the reactive 
process. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Overview of DFR-IoT Architecture (Source: [11]) 
 
In the most basic approach that has been employed in this 
section, the FRs should be fulfilled in order for the IoT 
environment to adapt to the proactive processes. Firstly, it is 
mandatory for an IoT environment to be subjected to the 
legal consideration, statutory provisions and digital forensic 
laws on forensic monitoring and digital forensic evidence 
collection. These aspects are based on the propositions that 
have been highlighted by Rowlingson [13], Yansinsac and 
Manzano [14] as well as Tan [15] on what should be logged, 
how it should be logged and when logging should be done. 
The next section gives an explanation of the relationship that 
exists between the FR and other respective components. 
A. Relationship of Functional Components 
Based on the previously constructed DFR-IoT 
architecture [11], this section gives a description of the main 
FRs of the DFR-IoT that can be used as design facet for the 
inclusivity of DFR mechanism in IoT. The FRs embodies the 
concepts of adding DFR in the already existing IoT 
environment. Additionally, the FRs makes it possible for the 
DFR-IoT architecture to be able to forensically acquire 
Potential Digital Evidence (PDE) from distributed and 
heterogeneous IoT environments. A number of FR’s have 
been considered with respective processes that have also 
been highlighted in Fig. 2, however, the process flows 
highlighted in Fig. 2 have also been shown in Fig. 3. 
 
1) IoT Requirements: From Fig. 2, the DFR-IoT 
architecture allows a forensic user to be able to interact with 
the first module (IoT Communication Mechanism-IoT-CM 
labelled a) of the DFR-IoT architecture. This interaction 
happens through the IoT sensor and device monitoring 
process that is labelled as 1. A detailed explanation of the 
processes that follows has been explained further in the 
following sections. 
 
2) Proactive Requirements: The proactive 
requirements are requirements that are needed in order to 
enforce DFR in IoT environment. This has been represented 
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in part labelled b. The components of the proactive 
requirements include Extraction of digital evidence, parsing 
forensic logs, digital preservation, creation of hash values, 
evidence storage, log analysis and characterisation and 
readiness report. Each of these requirements has been 
discussed in detail in the section to follow. 
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Fig. 2: Requirement and processes 
 
• Extract Digital Evidence (Logs):  A link is then 
created between the IoT-CM and the forensic user which 
allows the forensic user to be able to access multiple IoT 
modalities that allows possible digital evidence extraction. In 
part labelled 2, the IoT-CM connects to a mechanism that 
allows forensic logging process to be achieved so that the 
excavation of potential digital evidence is possible.  
It is worth noting again that the IoT-CM translates to the 
first process of the DFR-IoT architecture that was previously 
highlighted in Fig. 1. Based on the aforementioned 
explanations the authors have formulated notations and that 
are employed while extracting forensic logs from IoT-based 
environments. The following mathematical model has been 
employed in the extraction of the logs. 
j
zj
j jj ypy ≥ =1
          
ni .....2,1=
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}1,0{∈jp
, 
nzj ........1=
 
Where n represents the block of collected forensic logs, yj 
is the number of forensic logs collected which may be 
measured in (KB, MB, TB) from the node j. Zj is a probable 
number of nodes where logs are extracted from. 1=jp  if 
the log extractor moves to the node j and 0=jp  
otherwise. In order to detect, the IoT nodes through which 
data is being collected from, the authors have used 
ijj ypy ≥ . Based on this aspect, the log extractor, which 
can be a forensic agent or any other digital information 
capturing device, can be able to explicitly collect/extract 
forensic logs from IoT-based nodes. Based on this 
proposition the concept has been idealised in the parsing 
phase which is explained in the next section. 
• Parsing Forensic Logs (PFL): This process comes 
after digital forensic log extraction and is shown in Fig. 2 it 
has been labelled as step 3. PFL as a process may rely on 
regular expressions in order to extract a specific log that has 
a possibility of being used as admissible evidence in a court 
of law. By undergoing this process, a digital forensic 
investigator can be able to extract the log pattern and 
behaviour in order to aid the forensic investigators. A parser 
may be located in between the log extractor (step 3) and 
preservation mechanism (step 4).  
In addition, this is possible because voluminous logs that 
are collected are usually in the unstructured format during 
the acquisition process. We have represented parsing using a 
set  of alphabets or numerical values such that one can 
(1) 
(2) 
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be able to extract specific forensic logs from the collection 
of the alphabet/numerical. 
If  is considered to be a se or collection of numerical 
values or alphabets represented in the form [0,1…..9] and 
[a,b….z] respectively, we can represent a sequence 
].....,[ 21 nbbb=β  S.T ∈ib for ni ≤≤1 . Based on 
this formulation, we can define a sub-sequence of β  as 
follows: ].....,[ xkxixixi bbb=β . From the sub-sequence 
of β , it’s evident that xi∀  and ∈ix are represented in 
the form of nxx n ≤≤ ]......1[ 1 . To illustrate the concept 
using the real parsing example we consider the following 
sequences. If we take four sequences 
as ]10,8,6,4,2[=λ , ]5,4,2[=δ  , ]9,6,4[=φ  and 
]11,8,6[=α  then we can extract the specific logs based on 
the specificity of the values that exist commonly between 
[ ],, αφδ  and λ . This can be deduced as follows [2, 4], [4, 
6] and [6, 8]. Judging from this existence, it is possible to 
forensically parse logs from existing raw digital information. 
Nevertheless, according to Du [21], parsing logs in this 
manner makes log streaming easily due to an easy 
comparison of logs. 
• Create Hash Values:  Creation of Hash Values (HV) 
is factored in the process of hashing which in this context 
has been represented in step 5 of Fig. 2. It allows strings to 
be transformed into key values in order to represent the 
original string. Hashing in this context is used for log 
retrieval purposes for the forensic purposes. Additionally, it 
allows forensic logs to display HV when retrieved; these 
hash values can be used as unique keys to match collected 
logs for verification purposes. 
Hash functions can be used as algorithms for verifying 
this process. The hash function can be represented as a 
cryptographic algorithm. This can only be possible by 
encoding the collected logs to form message digest (MD5 or 
SHA-1) before storing the hash. 
HV can easily be created from a Message Digest (MD) or 
Hash Functions (HF). If x is an MD and P is a digital object 
then we can represent the x in terms of P as follows: 
Pxxf ∈:)(
and also Pyyf ∈:)(  where P can easily 
be preserved. P can also be presented as a positive integer 
and F can be represented as a hash function that contains a 
set of objects S. Given a set of digital objects 
].......,[ 21 twwww = and ]....,[ 21 nxxxx =  that can be 
hashed before storage, the following computations have been 
used to represent this actions. 

=
t
i i
w
1 and  =
n
i i
x
1
 
Based on this premise, the existence of digital information 
can be treated as a disjoint subset of and 
].......,[ 21 kpppp =
 which shows that there exists one 
function Ff ∈ S.T  
ξ=∈∈ }:)({}:)({ kt PyyfPxxf ∩
   
for any kt =  
This shows that HV and MD can easily be created for 
digital objects during the process of digital preservation. 
• Storage of Evidence:  The resulting hash from the 
collected forensic logs (evidence) is stored in a forensic 
database in step 5 of Fig. 2. To determine if the collected 
forensic logs are authentic or not verification is done based 
on the generated hash values. This is because, for example, 
an attack of Man-In-The-Middle (MIME) attack may have a 
possibility of compromising the forensic Logs. Due to this 
hash values are stored with the corresponding file names of 
each of the message digest (SHA-1 or MD5). 
• Log Analysis and Characterisation:  Log analysis 
in IoT environment is a process that is done after the 
potential digital evidence has been collected based on the 
processes that were previously highlighted in 
ISO/IECC27043: 2015, it has been shown in step of Fig. 6. 
Analysis conducted in order to maintain if the collected 
forensic logs’ integrity is maintained or not. This process is 
achieved based on the possible MD5 and SHA-1 message 
digest that is stored in the forensic database. Log 
characterisation as highlighted by Kebande and Venter [16] 
allows potential digital evidence to be grouped based on file 
formats. 
The analysis in this context can be conducted as a 
technique through which a forensic analyst tries to proof if 
the collected (Hashed Log, HL) is what it was in order to 
maintain integrity. For example, a forensic expert may pick 
the HL as nXHL ∈  and computes it by selecting a key 
>< ss YK , in order for it to produce a signature that will be 
used during the verification process. Each HL has a unique 
identifier (U_ID) and a timestamp it . For i=1 to n to n a 
forensic analyst is able to generate a signature based on the 
following equation: 
><= ss
IDU
ti YKHL ,||][ _ψ
 
Where U_ID is the unique identifier used to represent the 
hashed HL and it represents the time stamp of the HL. 
>< ss YK ,  represent the key that will be used together with 
the signature for verification. In this process, the forensic 
analyst is able to check the file metadata in a retrieval 
process that involves checking the HL’s it  and the U_ID, 
through which the HL is picked given that nXHL ∈ . It is 
worth noting that HL can be any random hashed log that has 
a  it and a U_ID respectively. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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To provide proof-by-verification by checking the HL and 
the signature in order to determine the integrity, a forensic 
analyst should perform a computation for HL as follows: 

=
∈=
n
i
nXHLC
1
 
This information may be used by a forensic analyst to 
compute the hash value for the HL and its properties. 
Therefore, the overall computation of the hash towards 
verification can be represented as follows: 
],_[∏
∈
==∈=
nXHL
ishn tIDUHXHLC
 
The above equation is the verification equation, which is 
invoked to provide the proof of HL and to show after 
analysis that the integrity of HL is maintained. After 
invocation the proof is provided as follows: 
PROOFYKVERIFYHL SS
SIGNATURE >=< ← ,  
• Forensic Readiness Report:  A readiness report is 
an outline that consists of the examination notes that shows 
the processes that have been undertaken to excavate 
potential evidence. This has been shown as the last process 
of Fig. 2. Reporting has also been mentioned in the ISO/IEC 
27043 as an integral process that gives the results that 
emanate from analysis and characterisation process. The 
importance of reporting is that it is useful during the 
reconstruction of events, a process that is very useful for the 
reactive (digital investigation) process.  
Fig. 3 represents the flow processes that as depicted 
previously in Fig. 2. Fig. 3 has been used to systematically 
show how each requirement is succeeded in each module. 
For purposes of simplicity, the processes start from the 
module a to b to c. It is worth noting once again that a 
number of the process that is shown in Fig. 3 have been 
mentioned in the ISO/IEC 27043 international standard. 
Additionally, the processes have been idealised in the DFR-
IoT architecture, and they are being used as high-level 
concepts for digital forensic investigation processes. 
3) Reactive Requirements 
Reactive requirements are forensic requirements that act 
as a post-event response techniques to the available potential 
digital evidence. The reactive requirements that have been 
considered in this context are discussed in the sections to 
follow. 
 
• Reconstruction of Events:  Reconstruction of events 
ensures that the collected potential evidence exists in an 
acceptable manner such that it can be admissible in a court 
of law if an incident is detected in IoT environments. This 
may include incident scenarios, system calls, and other 
proactive strategies. The design goals for reconstruction 
according to Liao & Langweg [17] are completeness, 
pertinence, reliability and privacy preservation. Nevertheless, 
Kebande and Venter [18], have also proposed the addition of 
reconstruction to a cloud forensic readiness model which 
appears to be a similar requirement. This mechanism allows 
the retrieval of the forensically logged information in order 
to search for events that can be reconstructed. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3  Flow processes 
 
 
• Digital Forensic Investigation Process:  Digital 
Forensic Investigation Process (DFIP) is the actual 
investigation process which also translates to the 
investigative process of the ISO/IEC 27043. It ensures that 
all the activities dealing with DFI, examination, and analysis 
are successfully conducted in IoT environments.  
 
• Possible Crime Scene Hypothesis:  A hypothesis 
will generally be used to prove or disprove a fact in a court 
of law. Generally, a hypothesis that is based on the activities 
that have been highlighted in the parts labelled a and b of 
Fig. 2 ensures that there always will exist a link between an 
incident and a perpetrator. Carrier and Spafford [19] have 
argued that a hypothesis may be used to examine and 
analyse traces which can help investigation processes. 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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 • Investigation Closure:  This represents the closing 
of pertinent cases that are focused on IoT incidents. It is 
worth noting again that investigation closure has also been 
mentioned as a very integral process in ISO/IEC 27043 that 
allows termination of the investigation processes. 
B. Discussion of the Propositions 
The authors have proposed the Functional Requirements 
(FRs) that are needed when DFR is added to IoT 
environment as a security component. The study has 
introduced essential requirements to the initially proposed 
DFR-IoT architecture. Additionally, the proposition that has 
been presented in this paper provides a generic approach, 
however, it is a much better approach given that at the time 
of writing this research paper, there existed no IoT 
environment that had a forensic capability that has a focus 
on ISO/IEC 27043 expect the DFIF-IoT, that was proposed 
by Kebande and Ray [20] which was able to incorporate the 
classes of digital investigation processes. 
The work that has been reported in this paper could act as 
a guide toward the development of DFR-IoT architecture 
which will easily enable compatibility with other 
components and devices. We have further addressed the 
need for (reactive requirements) forensic investigation 
process, which in a real sense is not the focal part of the 
study; however, it is an indicator that depends on DFR, since 
it falls under post-incident response. 
It is worth noting too that the requirements have been 
developed to suit Human to Machine (H2M) interaction, 
however, from this simplicity, it can also be applied to 
Machine to Machine (M2M) communication. This aspect 
can only be achieved by writing and running scripts that can 
enable effective communication between human and 
machines. 
Consequently, our solution makes it possible for the 
implementation of DFR-IoT during the design and 
development process. This is important because it will 
spearhead the identification of cyber-security based incidents 
in the IoT-based environment. Even though the study has 
been presented as a theoretical concept, it has an inherent 
applicability to the development of the DFR-IoT prototype. 
Precisely, if this notion would be falsified, then the DFR-IoT 
would not have a degree of communication between the 
different modules that were proposed in this research paper, 
otherwise, the notion holds.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the authors have discussed the functional 
requirements that are needed when adding DFR as a security 
component into IoT environment. The authors presented this 
using three approaches namely, IoT requirements, proactive 
requirements and reactive requirements. Being able to 
identify requirements is a crucial and a starting stage in the 
process of software development. This aspect is able to deal 
with the needs that are needed in order to design the 
software in the best way possible. With the current trends of 
innovative technologies, IoT technologies have started 
penetrating into every part of our daily lives, it is, therefore, 
important to build architecture with a forensic capability that 
can support the forensic community. Requirement gathering 
has been employed as a very important part towards the 
design of the DFR-IoT architecture. 
Nevertheless, having pointed out the requirements that are 
needed, this research, therefore, mentions future work that 
will involve the development of a DFR-IoT prototype. The 
focus of this prototype will be how contextual data can be 
gathered that can help to proactively prepare the IoT 
environments for digital forensic investigations. 
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